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   Abstract 
 
 
Prospects for Russia’s membership in the WTO now look better than any point since 
accession negotiations began almost a decade ago. Good progress with economic and legal 
reforms within Russia has left the country’s economy better prepared for membership. 
Nevertheless, the economy still suffers from various weaknesses including, but not limited to, 
pervasive subsidies for different sectors, lack of liberalization and foreign participation 
especially in the service sector, inefficiency in custom administration, lack of enforcement of 
intellectual property rights, etc. For all their sensitivity, the negotiations on the import tariff 
levels and access to the service sectors are the least of the problems. Much more difficult will 
be non-tariff barriers and the general trade-related legislative framework. Resolving the 
remaining weaknesses would be a complex process. However, given the importance of WTO-
related measures for the overall domestic structural reform, any delay in accession would be 
at least marginally negative for investor perceptions of country risk. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
Russia applied to the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) predecessor, the General 
Agreement on Trade and Tariff (GATT), in June 1993 hoping to join the organization before 
the end of the decade. However, a lack of initiative during the early years – which can be 
attributed to a government that is relatively new and, in many areas, still in the midst of 
formulating a legal and regulatory framework to meet a completely different political and 
economic environment – led the entire process to run out of steam. Following the 1998 
financial crisis, when Russia devalued the rouble and defaulted on its debt, efforts to keep the 
economy afloat left the authorities with little time to press ahead with WTO preparations.  
 
Active negotiations and discussions started again only after President Putin declared WTO 
accession as one of the goals of his presidency. His declaration generated a genuine political 
commitment that has enabled Russia to tackle a number of contentious accession issues. In 
May 2001, Russia presented a report on ’Review of the Russian Trade Policies’ that will serve 
as the basis for the Protocal of Accession. In Spring 2002, WTO’s Working Party on Russia’s 
accession reviewed the first draft of the report [Stern (2002)]. This means that Russia has 
entered the final phase of the accession process, in which it will negotiate the conditions of 
entry and implement the required legislative reforms. However, because of the many 
disagreements between Russia and the other countries, this final stage could take some time to 
complete [Yudaeva (2002a)].
1 
 
The aim of this paper is to discuss the potential accession conditions, the current state of 
negotiations, as well as potential effects of the accession for Russia. An analysis of Russia’s 
accession process is interesting for at least three reasons. First, the Russian Federation is one 
of around 30 countries which are  currently seeking accession to the WTO. Being one of the 
largest economies among the applicant countries, its accession has great potential to increase 
trade that would benefit current WTO members as well as Russia itself. On the other hand, its 
relative size and importance within the former Soviet Union countries (CIS), many of whom 
are also in the WTO accession process,  mean that Russia’s entry terms would have important 
implications for other countries [Hare (2002)]. In fact, there is already indication of this 
happening.  
 
Second, when Russia initially applied to the WTO, its economy had a different structure from 
traditional non-planned economies. A number of sectors (e.g., financial services) did not 
exist, and a number of important regulations were not formally legislated. Even now, after a 
decade of transition, formally legislated laws are not fully implemented and enforced. This 
has a direct consequence for the economy and for the accession. Since in many cases formal 
rules are absent and the economy is governed by a set of informal rules, authorities at 
different levels enjoy substantial discretion. Consequently, a number of WTO members have 
doubts about Russia’s ability to fulfill the obligations in the near future.  
 
Third, the fact that, like many of the other applicants, Russia is in the midst of a process of  
economic reform and transition towards a market economy also makes the accession process 
more complicated than it would be for an already well established market economy.  
 
                                                 
1 Unless all unsolved issues are settled by the summer of 2003, Russia may not be able to join the WTO over the 
next 2-3 years, in which case she might face some additional hurdles as new requirements concerning anti-
dumping measures and exports of labor force emerging from the Doha Round are likely to be presented later. 2 
The paper begins with a discussion  of the composition and direction of Russia’s foreign trade 
in Section 2. Section 3 provides a description of the negotiation process. The benefits and 
hurdles on the way to WTO membership are presented in Sections 4 and 5, respectively. 
Empirical results analyzing the effect of WTO accession for the Russian economy are 
reported in Section 6. The paper ends with concluding remarks. 
 
 
2.  Composition and Direction of Trade 
 
In order to set the stage for discussion, this section presents some salient features of the 
commodity and geographic composition of Russia’s foreign trade. In recent years, Russia has 
experienced surplus in both merchandise trade and current account. Merchandise surpluses 
have been huge, culminating in a surplus of $60 billion in 2000, $48 billion in 2001, $46 
billion in 2002, and about $15 billion in the first three months of 2003 (Table 1). Crude oil, 
petroleum products, natural gas, and metal are Russia’s main exports, accounting for about 
two-thirds of the export earnings in 2002 (Table 2). Russia’s current account has also shown 
record surplus – about $33 billion or 10.5 percent of GDP in 2002 (Table 1).  
 
 As shown in Table 2, Russia’s merchandise exports in 2002 totaled $100 billion.
2  Europe 
was the leading destination of Russian exports with 56 percent followed by Asia (including 
China and Japan) at 18 percent and CIS at 15 percent (Table 3). Only about 4 percent of 
Russian exports went to the United States. 
 
Russia’s total merchandise imports in 2002, exclusive of barter and shuttle trade, was $42 
billion (Table 4). Again, Europe was the major source of imports (49. percent) followed by 
the CIS countries (22. percent). Asia (including China and Japan) accounted for about 15 
percent while the USA’s share was slightly higher than 6 percent (Table 5). In terms of 
commodity composition, machines (equipment and instruments) and chemicals (including 
pharmaceuticals and rubber) account for a combined 53 percent of total imports while food 
and agricultural products account for 23 percent [Stern (2002)]. 
 
An analysis of these figures will show that Russia’s exports and imports are concentrated 
geographically with the EU, CIS, and Central and Eastern Europe. It enjoys a comparative 
advantage in raw materials and low value added products including oil, gas, metals, timber 
and artificial fertiliser; while its comparative disadvantage is in certain types of industrial 
products and, to a lesser degree, in services and agricultural products [Stern (2002), Yasin 
(2002)]. 
 
 
3.  The Negotiation Process
3 
 
Pursuant to the established procedure, a Working Party (WP) on accession, consisting of 
representatives of interested GATT countries, was formed in June, 1993. The mandate of the 
Working Party (transformed into the Working Party on Russia’s WTO accession after the 
WTO’s establishment) was to study the trade regime in Russia and negotiate the requirements 
                                                 
2 This figure does not include barter and what has come to be known as ’shuttle trade’ where individuals or 
groups frequently travel abroad and buy items including clothing, used cars, etc. to bring them to Russia for 
resale. 
3 For a discussion of the main procedural aspects of accession to the WTO, see the WTO website www.wto.org . 
 3 
for Russia’s participation in the WTO. As of June 2003, there are 67 member countries in the 
Working Party. 
 
Negotiations on Russia’s accession to WTO started in 1995. The WP has met on numerous 
occasions. Until April 2003, nineteen meetings of the WP have been held to examine the 
accession application and eventually submit recommendations, which may include the draft 
Protocal of accession, to the General Council.
4  
 
Initially, the WP focused on a detail study of the economic mechanisms, trade and political 
regime in Russia at multilateral level in terms of their conformity with the WTO rules and 
regulations. During 1998-99, Russia presented its preliminary proposals on tariffs (the list of 
the maximum admissible import customs duties), agriculture (measures to support national 
agricultural production and subsidize exports of agricultural products and food), and provision 
of free access to the national services market (the list of obligations to provide free access and 
the list of exceptions from the most-favored nation clause.  
 
Russia has also initiated a series of bilateral negotiations with all the interested members of 
the WP on the terms and conditions of Russia’s membership in WTO. The negotiations are in 
the areas of agriculture, the customs system (and customs union and other trade arrangements 
with CIS States), excise taxation and national treatment, import licensing, industrial subsidies, 
national treatment, Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT), Trade Related 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) and services.  
 
The latest round of talks included multilateral discussions on sanitory measures, access of 
services to the Russian market, import tariff quotas and agriculture, as well as bilateral talks 
on access of goods and services to the Russian market. The first bilateral agreement on access 
of goods to the Russian market has been signed. Russian legislations are also being brought in 
line with the norms and rules of the key WTO Agreements. The government has also 
submitted to the Duma the last draft law included in its WTO package. However, the most 
controversial issues still lie ahead, e.g., agricultural subsidies; EU demands that Russian 
domestic energy prices be better aligned with world market prices; access to Russian markets 
for telecommunications, finance, and transportation services markets; and demands that 
Russia accede to a voluntary agreement governing trade in civil aircraft (BOFIT, 2003).  
 
Key concerns in these negotiations include:
5 
 
•  subsidization of agriculture – in particular, Russia's claims to enter the WTO with 
subsidies above levels utilised in recent years;  
•  standards and conformity assessment –introduction of legislation ensuring the 
compliance of technical standards with WTO disciplines;  
•  import licensing and other non-tariff barriers – WTO members are challenging the 
WTO-consistency of Russian measures in this area; 
•  fees and charges on imports –commitment that fees and charges on imports (other than 
tariffs) do not afford protection to domestic production and any fees and formalities 
associated with import reflect the approximate cost of the services involved;  
                                                 
4 The minutes of each of these meetings are available at the website (www.wto.ru) maintained by the Ministry of 
Economic Development and Trade of the Russian Federation. 
5 For a more detail discussion on these concerns, see the website 
www.dfat.gov.au/trade/negotiations/accession/wto_russia.html  maintained by the Australian Department of 
Foreign Affairs and Trade. 4 
•  intellectual property protection – effective enforcement by Russia of intellectual 
property protection;  
•  judicial review of administrative decisions –greater clarification as to administrative 
and legal bodies in Russia for reviewing administrative decisions impacting on trade;  
•  consistency of sub-federal measures with the WTO –commitment from Russia that 
trade-related measures will be enforced consistently throughout the country and in a 
manner that does not result in unjustifiable restrictions on trade;  
•  Bilateral negotiations are placing particular emphasis on securing Russia's agreement 
to:  
commit to tariffs at low levels on products of current or prospective export interest to 
these countries – at present a number of proposed tariff rates are well above those 
currently applied to imports into Russia;  
improve market access and reform policies in the services sector – a number of 
countries are seeking commitments from Russia to guarantee levels of access to a 
number of sectors such as mining-related services, education, financial, legal and 
telecommunications. 
commit to removal of tariff quotas imposed on imports of meat; and 
remove non-tariff measures of concern to foreign industry, such as measures affecting 
the importation into Russia of food products. 
 
 
4.  Benefits of Membership 
 
Russia’s primary objectives in a bid to join the WTO is to obtain new trade advantages; gain 
access to foreign markets and provision of non-discriminatory treatment for Russian  
exporters; access to the international dispute settlement mechanism;
6 creation of a more 
favorable climate for foreign investments; creation of conditions for growth of domestic 
production’ quality and competitiveness as a result of increased flows of foreign goods, 
services and investments and; expansion of opportunities for Russian investors in the WTO-
member countries.
7 
 
WTO membership would bring clear economic benefits for Russia. Foreign trade has become 
increasingly important for the Russian economy, with exports rising from less than 20 percent 
of GDP in early 1990s to around 40 percent in 2002. In the first quarter of 2003, crude oil, 
fuel, gas and metal made up more than 75 percent of total exports, which leaves the country 
overly dependent on unstable international commodities markets. In order to achieve 
sustaibable economic growth, Russia will have to diversify its exports into higher-value added 
goods. 
 
However, being outside the WTO framework has made it unnecessarily complicated for 
Russian producers to find new markets as it allows for a more rigorous interpretation of anti-
dumping rules. According to the Russian Ministry of Foreign Trade, some 120 anti-dumping 
actions are currently in place against Russian products, costing the country up to US$ 4 
billion a year. Russia views many of these to be WTO non-compatible. Recent decisions by 
the United States and the European Union to classify Russia as a market economy under 
                                                 
6 The importance of this is illustrated by a recent bilateral trade dispute, during which Russia banned US chicken 
imports. This prompted threats from the US administration that it might withdraw political support for Russia’s 
WTO application.  
7 The list is based on various documents prepared by the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade of the 
Russian Federation. See also the website www.wto.ru 5 
antidumping and countervailing duty regimes may not fully alleviate this problem As it would 
make Russian subsidies on such public services as gas and electricity more susceptible to anti-
dumping and/or countervailing duty actions.
8 Although WTO membership does not render a 
country immune to protective action against the producers, it does provide access to the 
WTO’s dispute settlement mechanism. 
 
WTO membership would also mean a further liberalization of Russia’s domestic market. 
Import penetration is already relatively high, at 24 percent of GDP (compared with, say, 15 
percent in the US). Nevertheless, competitions are severely restricted in a number of areas and 
quasi-monopolies often exist on a sectoral and regional basis. International competition would 
help to weed out some inefficient producers and create a level playing field for more dynamic 
small and medium-sized enterprises.  Russia’s economy would also benefit from the 
implementation of WTO rules in areas such as investment regulations, trade in services and 
intellectual property. A more transparent business environment would help to attract much 
needed foreign investment. In short, the most tangible benefit of acceding to the WTO would 
be the improvement of the business environment. 
 
 
5.  Obstacles to Membership 
 
Since the completion of the Uruguay Round, countries acceding to the WTO have been held 
to a higher standard than those that joined in previous years. These include greater disciplines 
in tariff levels and agriculture supports; new obligations in rules and commitments covered by 
the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), TRIPS, and the Agreement on 
Agriculture;  and assuming obligations to a number of agreements, such as, TBT, customs 
valuation rules, and the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailihng Duties.
9 The exact 
nature of this type of obligations, which require the enactment of new laws and regulations to 
meet WTO obligations, depends on the results of the negotiations.  
 
The main areas of remaining dispute relate to tariff and non-tariff barriers and a number of 
trade-related distortions. These can be summarized under the following headings: 
 
5.1  Tariff Structure  
 
In contrast to many other countries, the Russian WTO accession does not coincide with any 
major trade liberalization. Russia liberalized its international trade in early- and mid-1990s as 
a part of the IMF stabilization program. Hence the effect of further trade liberalization will be 
rather modest [Yudaeva (2002a, 2002b)]. In the early 1990s, the country’s foreign trade 
regime had been characterized by a very complex import tariff structure including both ad 
valorem and specific tariffs, a variety of licensing requirements and other qualitative 
restrictions as well as export duties payable on exports of gas and oil.
10 Quantitative 
restrictions and export duties were abolished in the mid-1990s.  In the late 1990s, the 
weighted average import tariff in Russia was about 13.6 percent with a range from 0 to 30 
percent for most commodities [Michalopoulos and Tarr (1997)]. However, the effective rate 
                                                 
8 The EU formally recognized Russia as a market economy on May 29, 2002. Similar recognition were given by 
the U.S. on June 6, 2002.  
9 See Self (2002) for a more detail discussion of the core requirements that all countries that accede to the WTO 
after the Uruguay round have to satisfy.  
10 Brenton et al (1997) presents the official Russian trade-weighted tariffs for 1994 by major commodity groups. 6 
was close to 10 percent given the exemptions and pervasive noncollection [Hare (2002)].
11  
Table 6 shows the weighted average tariff rates (across all categories of imported goods) and 
the actual collection of import duties. The divergence between the official and actual tariff 
rate can be attributed to low administrative capacities and corruption practices. Export taxes 
have been reintroduced by the Primakov’s government after 1998 financial crisis. 
 
In early 2001, Russia undertook a major effort to reduce the number of rates in use and lower 
the average rate. Currently commodities are divided into four major subgroups – raw 
materials, semi-finished goods, food stuffs, and finished products - with marginal tariff rates 
of 5, 10, 15, and 20 percent, respectively. Although there are major exemptions [spirits (100 
percent), cigarettes (30 percent), sugar (30 percent) and cars (25 percent)], these changes have 
brought the average tariff rate down from 11.4 percent to 10.7 percent [Stamps (2001)]. 
Quantitative restrictions are still quite rare – the major exceptions are restrictions on poultry 
and meat products, introduced fairly recently.  
 
Russia is experiencing a strong domestic protectionist movement as a number of strong 
lobbying groups are insisting on an increase in tariffs during the accession to WTO.An 
example in point would be the auto industry. Russian automakers have proposed to retain 
high import duties on foreign cars after WTO accession for a transitional period of up to ten 
years. Bowing to the domestic pressure, in its WTO negotiations, Russia is proposing initial 
tariff bindings at levels well above current effective rates while the final bound rates - after 
the expiration of 5-7 years of transition period – will be close to the current effective tariff 
level [Hare (2002)]. For example, the proposed final bound rate for agricultural produce and 
food products are 25 percent as compared to a current tariff of 15 percent. As countries 
usually lower the tariff rates on accession to the WTO, Russia’s offer may not be acceptable 
to the other countries. However, the existing low level of tariff protection in Russia means 
that this would not be a source of major concern during the accession negotiations.  
 
5.2 Energy  Prices 
 
Another area of contention is the issue of state control over energy prices. According to 
OECD (2002) estimates, industrial subsidies in the form of cheap energy amounted to the 
equivalent of about 5 percent of GDP in 2000, thus potentially giving the Russian producers a 
comparative advantage over their foreign competitors. The EU and US are insisting that 
Russia’s domestic prices for energy resources must be closer to the world price and that 
significant reform should be carried out in the energy sector. Russia contends that lower 
energy prices are due to its comparative advantage and raising the domestic price of energy to 
the world-market levels would make Russian manufacturing uncompetitive. This proposal is 
also facing strong opposition from various lobbying groups within Russia. 
 
5.3  Agriculture 
 
During the early 1990s, Russian agriculture didn’t perform well. However, significant 
investment in recent years in large farms run by Russian companies coupled with favorable 
weather conditions has enabled food grain production to increase substantially [Tekoniemi 
(2003)]. Special WTO regulations allow countries to employ some non-tariff measures, such 
as import quotas and subsidies in agriculture. Such subsidies is quite prevalent in many 
countries (e.g., USA and the EU). By these standards, levels of subsidies to the Russian 
                                                 
11 This was much higher than the average external tariff of EU, but not very high by international standards. 7 
agriculture during the last few years has been relatively low creating a peculiar problem for 
the Russian position at the WTO negotiations.
12 Countries belonging to the Cairns Group 
(Australia, New Zealand and others) want the late 1990s to be used as a reference point such 
that the upper limit to the subsidy levels that Russia should commit would be low. Russia, on 
the other hand, want to use the late 1980s as the reference point when applied subsidies were 
much higher than at present.  
 
Further, given the large scale state-ownership in agriculture, translating Russian agricultural 
support measures into traditional WTO classifications of red, yellow and green light subsidies 
is difficult.
13 Agriculture related issues are currently being discussed in the Doha Round of 
multilateral negotiations. So the final conditions for accession are still fluid.  
 
5.4                Trade in Services 
 
Most WTO members would like to see a significant opening of the Russian service sectors to 
foreign-owned business and capital. Most of the service sector, e.g., financial sector, is either 
new to the Russian economy or performed a different role during the Soviet period.
14 The 
current negotiating position of Russia is influenced by domestic lobbying groups who use the 
infant industry argument in their defense. Russia insists on limiting foreign presence in a 
number of service sectors including banking and insurance in order to allow domestic 
producers to flourish, and also to retain state monopoly in some areas, e.g., 
telecommunications 
 
Much work also need to be done in the area of intellectual property rights. Copyright piracy in 
Russia is rampant and often run by organized crime syndicates.
15 Laws for protecting 
intellectual property are weak, lack strong criminal sanctions and are not well enforced. 
Hence active steps have to be taken by the state to draw up new laws and implement and 
enforce both the new and existing laws before acceding to the WTO. 
 
 
6.                    Empirical Estimates of the Effect of WTO Accession
16 
 
As discussed in the earlier sections, the major impact of WTO accession will occur through an 
improvement in the business environment as it becomes more transparent, accessible, and less 
riskier  with a better protection of property rights. A number of studies have tried to 
empirically estimate the economic impact of accession on the Russian economy. In the 
following sections, the results from various studies are briefly summarized. 
 
Jensen et al (2002) have used a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model to show that 
gains to Russia from WTO accession derive from at least four key effects: (i) improved access 
to the markets of non-CIS countries in selected products; (ii) improved domestic resource 
                                                 
12 Subsidy-like measures provided by the regional governments, for example, barter schemes that allow the 
exchange of fuel and fertilizers for agricultural crops, are quite common [Amelina (2000)]. However, these 
schemes are often not transparent making it difficult to measure the size of the transaction. 
13 See Self (2002) for a discussion of the red, yellow, and green subsidies. 
14 The service sector includes transportation, telecommunication, education, financial services, culture and art, 
public health, sports, science, etc. 
15 The International Federation of the Phonographic Industry, music’s global trade body recently singled out 
Russia as one of the ten countries that should take urgent action against music piracy, e.g., counterfeiting. See 
Financial Times, July 11, 2003, p. 2.  
16 I would like to thank Ksenia Yudaeva for suggesting the empirical studies published in the Russian language. 8 
allocation since tariff reduction induces the country to shift production to sectors where 
production is valued more highly based on import prices closer to world market prices; (iii) 
higher Russian factor productivity due to availability of better imported technologies and 
techniques from multinational firms that increase their foreign direct investment; and (iv) 
positive effects on the growth rate from increases in the rate of return to capital.  
 
Using the CGE model, they estimate the gains to Russia from WTO accession to be about 8 
percent of Russian consumption (or about 4 percent of GDP) in the medium run, and as high 
as 69 percent of Russian consumption (29 percent of GDP) in the long run. Almost 70 percent 
of this total gains are due to improved access for foreign investors to the service sector 
(around 5 percent of consumption in the short-run). Tariff reduction amounts to an additional 
25 percent of total gains (2 percent of consumption). The rest of the gains are attributed to 
productivity effects and improved market access for foreign firms in the manufacturing 
sector.
17  
 
In terms of the sectoral impact, the paper predicts that sectors that currently export or have 
little protection, such as, ferrous and non-ferrous metals, chemical and timber, wood pulp and 
paper products, will expand while business services will record significant contraction. 
However, sectors that are expected to expand are mostly energy-sensitive. So any reform in 
the energy sector could significantly affect the paper’s prediction. 
 
Using a model similar to Jensen et al (2002), Zemnitsky (2002) analyzes the impact of 
liberalizing the access of foreign firms to the financial sector on labor demand. Given the 
rigidity in labor movement in this sector, he shows that labor will gain from liberalization 
only if it is mobile. Consequently, he proposes that foreign firms should be required to 
employ Russian labor. 
 
Ustenko (2002) uses survey results to investigate the impact on the aluminium industry of an 
increase in energy prices following prospective WTO acession. The Russian primary 
aluminium producers will gain from accession because of better access to the world market 
and higher employment. On the other hand, the expected decrease in import tariffs will 
increase competition in the secondary aluminium products market driving some producers 
away from the market and increasing unemployment. Domestic consumers will gain with a 
decrease in price and increase in quality for secondary aluminium products. Overall, the 
findings of the study support the country’s accession to the WTO. 
 
The Higher School of Economics (2002) uses a macroeconomic model to forecast the effects 
of WTO accession. The study compares a base scenario (where Russia does not enter the 
WTO) with four different variations of Russia’s 2002 tariff offer. The results indicate that any 
of the four WTO accession scenarios would lead to a 0.4 percent higher GDP growth than the 
base scenario between 2002 and 2010. The difference in effects under the four separate 
scenarios is minimal.    
 
CEFIR (2002) published a collection of several studies analyzing different aspects of the 
accession process. First, using firm-level panel data, the paper estimates tariff elasticities of 
employment of Russian firms. The results show that food and light industry and machine 
building  are the most sensitive to changes in tariff. At the regional level, a uniform 1 
                                                 
17 A number of econometric studies using firm-level data have shown that the entry of foreign direct investment 
in downstream sectors has positive effects on domestic suppliers. See Yudaeva (2002b) for additional insights on 
the productivity effects. 9 
percentage point decrease in the tariff rates would lead to a more than 1 percentage point 
decline in industrial employment in four regions – Evreiskaya, Ivanovskaya and Kurganskaya 
oblasts and Adygeya. The remaining regions would experience a less than proportional 
decline. 
 
Second, the paper finds inconclusive results on the effect of an increase in competition with 
imports on the level of productivity of Russian firms. While demonstration and incentive 
effects may have a positive impact, pure competition effect will be negative. Third, the paper 
estimates that a decline in tariff rates to 5 percent in several categories of durable goods  - 
clothing, construction materials, fabrics, furniture, household electronic appliances, shoes, 
and transports – would lower average per capita household expenditures by 540 rubles, 
measured in 2000 prices. The rate of decline varies from a low of 2.7 percent in construction 
materials to a high of 22.4 percent in household electronic appliances. 
 
Fourth, using a gravity model, the paper shows that WTO accession will increase foreign 
direct investment in Russia by up to US $4 billion. Finally, the paper argues that liberalization 
of the entry of foreign banks and trans-border banking activities will encourage economic 
growth. In particular, a doubling of the number of foreign banks operating in Russia will 
increase economic growth rate by about 1 percentage point, while a doubling of trans-border 
credits to non-banking Russian institutions will increase growth rate by 1.6 percent.  
 
A study sponsored by the National Investment Council (2002) employ an econometric model 
(Russian Inter-Industry Model) to measure the impacts of WTO accession on a number of 
sectors and regions. Two scenarios of accession are considered: a ’moderate’ scenario 
allowing for gradual transition and the phased removal of protectionist barriers, and a ’worst-
case’ scenario implying faster tariff reductions than Russia is currently proposing. 
Interestingly, the study finds little difference in the impacts between fast and phased 
convergence.  
Overall, the study did not find any major negative impact on the national economy. In the 
worst case scenario, the adverse effect on GNP would be held to less than one percentage 
point. 
 
However, impacts within specific sectors and regions could be significantly more dramatic. 
Russia stands to benefit from WTO membership through integration into the international 
legal framework, which could contribute strongly to Russia’s development of a coherent 
system of laws and regulations. This would have a positive impact on the country’s 
investment climate. Certain sectors including telecommunications, metallurgy, footwear, 
garments, electronics, strong alcoholic beverages, etc. stands to benefit from accession to 
WTO. On the other hand, increased competition can be expected in a number of sectors 
including, but not limited to, pharmaceuticals, furniture, insurance industry, retail, and certain 
parts of the chemical industry. 
 
Finally, the paper tries to identify the regions which are most sensitive to changes in the tariff 
policy. Estimations reveal that the following nine regions, with a high import share of 
consumption and a high share of industries that are affected by tariff changes, are most 
sensitive – Irkutskaya oblast, Kaluzhskaya oblast, Leningradskaya oblast, Moskovskaya 
oblast, Moscow, Primorsky kray, Republic of Karelia, St. Petersburg and Yaroslavskaya 
oblast. Using Russia’s 2002 offer as the WTO accession scenario, the paper predicts an 
increase in GDP from 0.13 percent to 0.67 percent depending on the region, and an increase 
in employment from 320 to about 10,000 individuals. 10 
 
To summarize, the overall results from the empirical studies show a positive effect on the 
domestic economy. A number of specific conclusions can also be derived. First, as the current 
tariff rate in Russia is already relatively low, a further decline in rates after WTO accession 
will not have a significant impact on the economy. On the other hand, a decrease in non-tariff 
barriers would have a positive impact. Second, reform in the services sector is expected to 
generate significant positive externalities. Third, natural resource extracting sectors and 
producers of metals and chemicals are likely to gain the most from accession, while labor 
intensive sectors, such as, food and light industries, and machine building industries would 
experience the most adverse effect.  
 
7.  Concluding Remarks 
 
Prospects for Russia’s membership in the WTO now look better than any point since 
accession negotiations began almost a decade ago. Good progress with economic and legal 
reforms within Russia has left the country’s economy better prepared for membership.  
 
Nevertheless, the economy still suffers from various weaknesses including, but not limited to, 
pervasive subsidies for various sectors through, for example, low energy prices; absence of a 
uniform tariff structure; inefficiency in customs administration; lack of liberalization and 
foreign participation especially in the service sector; lack of enforcement of intellectual 
property rights, etc. 
 
The original timetable for an entry to the WTO by 2003  has slipped.
18 This means that Russia 
would not be able to become a full participant in the current ’Doha Round’ of multilateral 
trade talks where new regulations on sensitive trade areas, such as, textiles and agriculture 
will be discussed. 
 
But this timescale always looked ambitious, and all the more so after the last few rounds of 
tough negotiations on reducing tariffs in key sectors such as autos, aerospace and 
pharmaceuticals, or on lifting restrictions on foreign entry into the domestic financial market. 
The necessary Russian concessions on some or all of  these matters would mean overcoming 
some powerful vested interests at home.  
 
For all their sensitivity, the negotiations on the import tariff levels and access to its service 
sectors are the least of the problems, since the negotiating parties can quickly come to an 
agreement provided there is sufficient political will on both sides. Delays here will be mainly 
due to negotiating tactics.  
 
Much more difficult will be non-tariff barriers, and the general trade-related legislative 
framework. Here, the key issues are Russia’s low regulated energy tariffs and agricultural 
subsidies. On the legislative front, the Duma has to address relevant legislations  for WTO 
accession  including the Customs Code, the liberalization of currency and controls and, in the 
area of non-tariff barriers, the law of technical regulations. 
 
The large number of outstanding issues may well cause further delays in accession. Resolving 
the weaknesses would be a complex and painful process. However, given the importance of 
                                                 
18 Russia now expects to complete bilateral market access negotiations with the trading partners by the end of 
2003. See Financial Times, July 11, 2003, p. 6. 11 
WTO-related measures for the overall domestic structural reform, any delay  would be at least 
marginally negative for investor perceptions of country risk. 
 
Ultimately the advantages of membership outweigh the disadvantages. As pointed out by 
many analysts, the disadvantages are mostly tactical, short-term and immediate; while the 
advantages are strategic. By joining the WTO following necessary reforms, Russia can still 
reap the full benefits of more free trade. It would be a logical continuation of Russia’s 
advance towards a full market economy. 12 
Table 1  
 
    Main Indicators of the Russian Economy 
 
 
Macroeconomic indicators 
   1996   1997  1998    1999    2000      2001      2002  2003  as of 
GDP, %  -3.6  1.4  -5.3  6.4  10.0  5.0  4.3     
Industrial production, %  -4.5  2.0  -5.2  11.0  11.9  4.9  3.7  6.3  1-4/03 
Fixed investments, %  -18.0  -5.0  -12.0  5.3  17.4  8.7  2.6  10.9  1-4/03 
Unemployment, % (end of period)  9.3  9.0  11.8  11.7  10.2  9.0  7.1  8.9  4/03 
Exports, $ billion  89.7  86.9  74.4  75.6  105.0  101.9  107.2  29.9  Q1/03 
Imports, $ billion  68.1  72.0  58.0  39.5  44.9  53.8  61.0  15.3  Q1/03 
Current account, $ billion  10.8  -0.1  0.2  24.6  46.8  35.0  32.8  11.9  Q1/03 
 
 
Source: Goskomstat, CBR. 
 
 
 
Fiscal indicators for federal government (% of GDP, unless otherwise indicated; end-year figures for debt) 
 
   1996    1997  1998   1999    2000    2001    2002   2003  as of  2003 budget 
Revenues 
1 12.5  12.3  11.0  12.6  15.5  17.6  20.3  20.6  Q1/03  18.5 
Expenditures 
1 20.9  19.4  16.9  13.9  14.3  14.7  18.8  17.4  Q1/03  18.0 
Balance  -8.4  -7.1 -5.9 -1.4  1.2  2.9  1.4  3.2 Q1/03  0.6
  
Foreign currency debt  31.6  30.2  50.1  87.7  55.3  44.4  36.2       
Foreign currency debt, $ bln  136.1  134.6  158.2  154.6  143.4  133.1  123.5       
 
 
1 Since 2002 social tax is included in the federal budget. 
Source:  Budget: IMF 1995-1998, Economic Expert Group 1999-2003. Debt: IMF 1995-1999, Minfin 2000-2003. 
 
 
 
 
Monetary indicators 
  1995      1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001  2002 2003 as of
Inflation (CPI), 12-month,  %  131          22 11.0 84.4 36.5 20.2 18.6  15.1 13.6 5/03
M2, 12-month growth, %  113          30 29.5 36.3 57.2 62.4 40.1  32.3 42.6 4/03
Average wage, $ (period average, except last)  104        154 164 108 62 79 111  142 161 4/03
Deposit interest rate, % (period average)  102          55 16.8 17.1 13.7 6.5 4.9  5.0 4.3 3/03
Lending interest rate, % (period average)  320        147 32.0 41.8 39.7 24.4 17.9  15.7 13.4 3/03
Forex reserves, $ bln (incl. gold)  17.2       15.3 17.8 12.2 12.5 27.9 36.6  47.8 59.8 4/03
RUB/USD (end of period)  4640      5560 5960 20.65 27.00 28.16 30.14  31.78 30.71 5/03
 
 
Source: Goskomstat, CBR. 
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Table 2 
 
   Russian Federation: Composition of Merchandise Exports, 2002 
 
 
     I n   P e r c e n t   o f  
   V a l u e   ( $   m . )    Total Exports
  
Total exports (f.o.b.)    100,312 
  Food beverage, and agr. products      2,173      2.2 
  Stone and ore           580      0.6 
  Fuel products      55,737    55.6   
      Oil and oil products      38,585    38.5 
            Crude      27,445    27.4 
            Oil products      11,140    11.1 
      Gas        15,359    15.3 
      Coal          1,151      1.1 
      Other             643      0.6 
  Chemicals (inc. Pharmaceuticals)      6,775      6.8 
  Leather             186      0.2 
  Wood and paper products       4,692      4.7 
  Textiles and clothing           654      0.7 
  Gems and precious metals      4,760      4.7 
  Metals        14,166    14.1 
  Machines, equipment, instruments      9,164      9.1 
  Other, including ceramics and glass      1,425      1.4 
 
 
Note: Total trade excludes shuttle trade. Data from Belarus is also excluded. 
Source: IMF (2003, Table 31)   
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   T a b l e   2  
 
           Russian Federation: Destination of Exports, 2002 
 
   Total   In  Percent  of 
   Exports  ($  m.) Total  Exports
  
Total  exports    106,154 
    CIS        15,609     14.7 
         Belarus         5,843       5.5 
         Kazakhstan        2,413       2.3 
         Ukraine        5,853       5.5 
         Other          1,501       1.4 
 
    Non-CIS        90,545     85.3 
 
         Europe       59,272     55.8 
                Czech Republic        1,509       1.4 
                Finland        2,925       2.8 
                France        2,649       2.5 
                Germany        8,035       7.6 
                Hungary        2,167       2.0 
                Ireland           260       0.2 
                Italy                                              7,432       7.0 
                Netherlands        7,267       6.8 
                Poland                                          3,719       3.5 
                Slovak Republic       2,032       1.9 
                Switzerland        5,367       5.1 
                UK        3,774       3.6 
                Other      12,136     11.4 
     
    Asia        19,043     17.9 
                China        6,819       6.4 
                Japan        1,803       1.7 
                Other      10,420       9.8 
 
    Western Hemisphere       7,447       7.0 
                US        3,983       3.8 
                Other       3,464       3.3 
 
     Middle East and Africa      4,722       4.4 
     Other              61       0.1 
 
Note: Based on exports according to the Direction of Trade Statistics, which differ somewhat 
from those compiled by the Central Bank of Russia and given in Table 2. 
 
Source: IMF (2003, Table 30) 15 
   T a b l e   4  
 
Russian Federation: Composition of Merchandise Imports, 2002 
 
     I n   P e r c e n t   o f  
   V a l u e   ( $   m . )    Total Imports 
 
Total imports (c.i.f.)    42,103 
    Food, beverage, agr. products    9,816    23.3 
    Stone and ore         667      1.6 
    Fuel products      1,001      2.4 
    Chemicals (inc. Pharmaceuticals)    7,305    17.3 
    Leather           170      0.4 
    Wood and paper products    1,758      4.2 
    Textiles and clothing      1,899      4.5 
    Gems and precious metals         40      0.0 
    Metals        2,591      6.2 
    Machines, equipment, instruments  15,180    36.1 
    Other, inc. Ceramics and glass    1,676      4.0 
 
 
 
Note: Excludes shuttle trade; also excludes data from Belarus. 
Source: IMF (2003, Table 33) 
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   T a b l e   5  
 
             Russian Federation: Origin of Imports, 2002 
 
   Total   In  Percent  of 
   Imports  ($  m.) Total  Exports
  
Total  exports        46,156       
    CIS        10,233     22.2 
         Belarus         4,054       8.8 
         Kazakhstan        1,945       4.2 
         Ukraine        3,226       7.0 
         Other          1,008       2.2 
 
    Non-CIS        35,923     77.8 
 
         Europe       22,720     49.2 
                Czech Republic           560       1.2 
                Finland        1,515       3.3 
                France        1,892       4.1 
                Germany        6,586     14.3 
                Hungary           512       1.1 
                Ireland           199       0.4 
                Italy                                              2,222       4.8 
                Netherlands        2,222       2.3 
                Poland                                          1,297       2.8 
                Slovak Republic          158       0.3 
                Switzerland           417       0.9 
                UK        1,117       2.4 
                Other        5,189     11.2 
     
    Asia          6,792     14.7 
                China        2,395       5.2 
                Japan           979       2.1 
                Other        3,418       7.4 
 
    Western Hemisphere       5,491     11.9 
                US        2,972       6.4 
                Other       2,519       5.5 
 
     Middle East and Africa         757       1.6 
     Other            164       0.4 
 
Note: Based on imports according to the Directioon of Trade Statistics, which differ 
somewhat from those compiled by the Central Bank of Russia and given in Table 4. 
 
Source: IMF (2003, Table 32) 
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Table 6 
 
Russia’s Import Tariff Rate (in percent) 
 
 
   1996 1997 1998 1999 
 
Nominal weighted average     14    14    12     8 
tariff rate 
 
Effective tariff rate       4     7     7     5 
(actual duty collected/import) 
 
 
Source: Gorban et al (2001)  
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